SDI and British-French nuclear modernization: Threats to alliance coherence, cohesion, and confidence and to East-West nuclear stability by Kolodziej, Edward A.
ACDIS KOL.9. 
1985 
OCCPAP 
ACDIS Library
Program in 
Arms Control, Disai
and
International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
5/2/85
SDI and British-French Unclear 
Modernisation Threato to AlliaiKt 
Coherence, Cohesion, and Confidence 
and to Bast-Meat Huclear Stability
Paper Presented at the 
Wlngspread Conference Center 
May 2-5, 1985
on
"Rethinking the Nuclear Dilemma in Europe"
Sponsored by the Harold E Stassen Project for World Peace, Hubert H Humphrey 
Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota and the Johnson Foundation, 
Racine, Wisconsin
Edward A Kolodziej, Director 
Program in Arms Control, Dlsarmanent 
and International Security (ACDIS) 
University of Illinois
SDI and British-French Nuclear Modernization Threats to Alliance 
Coherence, Cohesion, and Confidence and to East-West Nuclear Stability
Edward A Kolodziej, Director 
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament 
and International Security 
University of Illinois
Summary
Assumptions
1 The stability of the East-West balance depends on the response of the 
western states to two imperatives coherent and cohesive alliance 
strategies to meet Soviet and eastern bloc threats at all levels of 
potential hostilities and public support for national and alliance 
policies
2 Differences over strategic policies m  the West, while structural, 
have, until now, been manageable They derive from rival conceptions 
of nuclear and conventional arms stability The factors explaining 
these differences are multiple differing national strategic needs, 
geographic and historic circumstances, economic and technological 
capabilities, dissimilar (albeit open) domestic political 
consensus-building and decision-making systems as well as leadership 
styles, divergent conceptions among alliance partners of their regional 
and global roles in promoting security, and contrasting perceptions of 
the Soviet threat and assessments of the probabilities of achieving 
reliable and verifiable arms accords with Moscow
3 Structural differences within the alliance, already difficult to 
surmount under the best conditions of mutual confidence among western 
governments, are exacerbated by the existence of a significant body of 
European opinion profoundly suspicious of most American military and 
arms control measures and convinced that U S policies are more a part 
of the European security problem than a solution to it
Problem
Unless properly and promptly managed, SDI and British-French nuclear 
modernization will place serious strains on alliance cohesion and coherent 
policy-making, deepening, conceivably to a breaking point, the structural 
differences already evident in the strategic policies pursued by alliance 
partners
SDI (a) may weaken human and political control over the evolution of 
a^*-ance strategy and the East-West balance, (b) may Initiate a new arms race at 
great cost and may de-stabilize the East-West balance with a net decrease in 
security for alliance members, (c) may hamper allied efforts to meet lesser but 
cri^ ca-l* threats at levels of conflict lower than strategic nuclear war, (d) may 
undermine the ABM treaty and progress on specific arms control accords, and (e) 
may erode alliance cohesion, strategic coherence, and mutual confidence in
2responding co Soviet threats In the latter instance, SDI may create the 
illusion that the American homeland can be made a sanctuary, while leading to 
the deployment of active defense systems by the superpowers whose principal 
Impact will be the depreciation of the British and French nuclear deterrents
British-French nuclear modernization advances a generational trend m  the 
evolution of the East-West nuclear balance toward the progressive 
multilateralization of deterrence Soviet and American strategies must 
increasingly take account of British and French nuclear capabilities, the 
announced and operational strategies directing these forces, the circumstances 
under which they might be threatened or used, their relation to conventional 
deterrence and defense, and their implication for arms control accords and 
global proliferation
In carrying out their own autonomously directed strategies, British and 
French planners, whether publicly acknowledged or not, are logically impelled to 
assess the impact of superpower policies on their nuclear systems and the impact 
of their systems on each other over the same set of concerns confronting Soviet 
and American strategists Alliance inattention to these concerns is a 
potentially significant threat to alliance coherence, cohesion, and confidence 
—  all the more so if the problem of growing British and French nuclear 
capabilities is not addressed in tandem with SDI
Remedy
None is readily apparent A precondition for progress, however, is clearer 
recognition than marks current western policies of the complex problems posed by 
multilateral deterrence —  among the western nuclear allies and between them and 
the Soviet Union The Geneva talks are too narrow and confining to be an 
entirely satisfactory framework within which to diagnose and remedy alliance and 
East-West ills rooted in strategic policy
A more formally structured and continuing process of multiple bilateral 
talks than exists today between the four autonomous centers of nuclear 
decísion-making in the West and m  the Soviet Union should be initiated to 
encourage a common western response to the Soviet threat and to enhance 
East-West nuclear stability On the western side, the purpose of these 
consultations would be to bridge existing differences over strategic policy or 
at least not to widen them On the Soviet side, bilaterally directed talks 
between the western nuclear powers and the Soviet Union can be aimed at assuring 
Moscow that its legitimate national security interests can be addressed m  terms 
of the differential threats posed by the existence of three western nuclear 
powers Meanwhile, Moscow can be held to a rigorous standard in meeting the 
specific security needs of the western democracies
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The nuclear modernizations programs, offensive and defensive, now being 
implemented or seriously proposed by the western nuclear states and the Soviet 
Union pose critical problems for the stability of the European and global 
nuclear balance The Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
and the dramatic growth of British and French nuclear capabilities add new 
strains on the arms race now underway between the superpowers Current and 
emerging instabilities must be addressed promptly along a broad political front, 
within and outside the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, before they split the 
a^ ^ ance an<* damage efforts, principally those being pursued at Geneva in the 
superpower arms control talks, to manage the nuclear balance and the conflicts 
that divide the two blocs in Europe and elsewhere
Part one diagnoses the disturbing elements of the evolving nuclear 
environment which promotes instability part two suggests an approach that 
might be considered to bring these destabilizing trends under control to promote 
the development of more coherent, cohesive, and mutually confident alliance 
strategic policies than exist today and to enhance East-West stability
Instabilities within the East—West Nuclear Environment 
and Their Implications for the Atlantic Alliance
Requirements of a Stable Western Deterrent Posture
Strategic stability between East-West and the preservation of an effective 
and credible deterrent posture hinge, from the perspective of the West, on two
2critical imperatives coherent and cohesive alliances strategies to meet Soviet 
and eastern bloc threats at all levels of potential hostilities and public 
support for national and alliance policies Included within this rubric are (a) 
agreed upon policies for the use and threit of nuclear weapons, (b) accord on 
conventional and nuclear force levels, deployments, and c3l systems, and, 
finally, (c) a common approach to arms control negotiations with the Soviet 
Union The second imperative derives from the need to generate domestic 
approval of national and alliance use, threat, and arms control policies These 
imperatives must be simultaneously met if the western alliance is to preserve a 
stable deterrent posture in meeting the Soviet threat and in maintaining a 
stable nuclear balance that deters war
Maintenance of a stable western strategic deterrent posture is challenged 
by three unfavorable trends The first stems from continued Soviet military 
build-up of conventional, theater-nuclear, and strategic forces that appear to 
be in excess of legitimate security and defensive concerns Second, there are 
serious rifts between the U S and West European government and among the latter 
about the proper strategic and arms control response to the Soviet challenge 
These rifts have now been extended to the public at large within the western 
states, further deepening intergovernmental and bureaucratic misunderstandings 
and suspicions The Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
is only the latest of what now appears to be chronic perturbations in western 
security relations
To the differences now dividing the West should now be added the 
modernization programs of British and French nuclear forces While global and 
European strategic stability still primarily depend on U S and Soviet behavior, 
the West European term of the equation of strategic balance must be accorded
3more weight today as a source of instability than in the past Unless 
controlled through allied consultation and accord, uninhibited pursuit of SDÌ 
and European nuclear forces may split the alliance wider than it is at present 
—  so wide as to be unmanageable and Irreparable
Soviet Military Build-up
Much of the problem of strategic stability and western cohesion lies with 
the Soviet Union However much American initiatives and U S -European 
differences and misunderstandings may have contributed to current instabilities, 
the expansion of Soviet theater and long-range strategic forces, together with 
the development of Impressive air and ballistic missile defense research 
programs and conventional force modernization, has been responsible for much of 
western concern about maintaining deterrence On these points most of the 
western governments appear agreed Sir Geoffrey Howe in his recent and widely 
reported March speech, which raised serious questions about SDI, took pains to 
underscore Soviet ABM programs as a threat to East-West nuclear stability 1 The 
Mitterrand government has consistently accused the Soviet Union to be the 
principal de-stabilizlng force in Europe 2 German governments, have invariably 
assumed a similar stance, opposed to Soviet expansion and modernization of its 
missile and bomber forces as a threat to the West
At the European level, Soviet Backfire bombers, tactical aircraft, air 
defense forces, and SS-20, SS-4, SS-12/22, and. shorter-range Scuds, FROGS, and 
SS-21 missiles pose a serious threat to NATO forces, including British and 
French nuclear systems At a global level, heavy Soviet rockets, particularly 
308 SS-18s with up to ten 750 kt warheads, threaten American ground-based 
systems The Krasnoyarsk phased-radar system may well be in violation of the
4SALT I treaty It may also signal a determined Soviet drive to assume a lead in 
battle-ready ABM systems, providing justification for American and allied 
expansion of ABM research and development
American and European Differences over Responses 
to Soviet Nuclear Modernization
Structural Opposition to U S Policies
Differing U S -European responses to Soviet strategic behavior also 
undermine the stability of the western deterrent posture and the East-West 
balance The sources of these differences are both structural and conjunctural 
The former need only concern us here as background to an analysis of the 
contribution of SDI and French and British nuclear programs to real and 
potential divisions within the western camps
First, a significant but still minority body of European opinion is, for a 
variety of reasons, deeply suspicious of most American military and arms control 
measures calculated to match or moderate Soviet strategic moves Measured by 
the past, its numbers appear to be growing although at different rates across 
the spectrum of European states If the INF controversy is taken as a crude 
index, opposition to nuclear modernization is particularly strong in Britain, 
West Germany, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries of NATO Among 
larger states, only the governments of France and, to a lesser degree, Italy 
have escaped recent heavy domestic pressures to oppose U S policies
The presence of this resistant body of European opinion to American 
strategic and arms control initiatives at once limits the ability of NATO 
governments to cooperate with the U S on nuclear and conventional arms 
modernization and provides the Soviet Union with opportunities to manipulate
5western public opinion and governments In anticipation of these domestic 
forces and to better manage them, the Europeans insisted on an INF deployment 
procedure in the December 1979 accord that included strong arms control 
provisions 3 The Reagan administration's zero option position was as much aimed 
at European public opinion in an effort to quiet domestic opposition to eventual 
Pershing II and cruise missile deployments as it was a challenge to the Soviet 
Union to dismantle lts SS-20 forces * The formula worked, aided by the firmness 
of the administration as well as by the rigidity of the Soviet Union in refusing 
to compromise and its mishandling of the Korean Airline 007 incident The 
failure of the "walk-in-the-woods" proposal, rejected by both superpowers, 
suggests that neither was willing to budge much For the U S and the Soviet 
Union, the prize was West European public opinion and governments and a Germany 
anchored to the West These prizes surpassed in Importance the nuclear hardware 
advantage that might be accorded to the East or West in deploying intermediary 
nuclear weapons in Europe
Structural Constraints on Atlantic Strategic Accord
Second, even in those governmental, bureaucratic, and public quarters on 
both sides of the Atlantic where good will and mutual confidence are high, one 
must continue to expect major differences among the Europeans and between them 
and the United States over security policies At issue are rival conceptions of 
nuclear and conventional arms stability The factors explaining these 
differences are multiple differing national strategic needs, geographic and 
historic circumstances, economic and technological capabilities, dissimilar 
(albeit open) domestic political consensus-building and decision-making systems 
as well as leadership styles, divergent conceptions among alliance partners of
6their regional and global roles in promoting security, and contrasting 
perceptions of the Soviet threat and assessments of the probabilities of 
achieving reliable and verifiable arms accords with Moscow
It is against this background that one is able to explain why Europeans 
generally prefer a posture of nuclear deterrence over American demands for a 
flexible response defense strategy capable of meeting Soviet aggression over a 
broad range of conventional, tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear threats 
Germany excepted, the Europeans have successfully resisted American pressures 
over the past quarter century to increase Europe's conventional forces to a 
level deemed adequate by Washington to match Soviet non-nuclear modernization 
American threats of pull-out or hedging over the first-use of nuclear weapons 
have failed to stir the Europeans to increase spending substantially for their 
non-nuclear forces The British and French have developed their own nuclear 
forces partly at the expense of conventional forces
Most Europeans also prefer a strategy accented toward detente and arms 
control over a policy of nuclear modernization aimed at matching Soviet nuclear 
capabilities The INF controversy exposed the deep roots of West Germany's 
inclinations to find a solution to nuclear modernization that would be least 
provocative to the Soviet Union While the Kohl government has been staunch in 
supporting Washington on INF, strong elements within the present German CDU-Free 
Democratic coalition temporized over Pershing II deployment while many of their 
opponents in the SPD were dead set against the INF deployments, whether the 
Soviet Union dismantled its theater nuclear forces or not Detente has yielded 
tangible gains for the Germans which they are wary to risk by provoking Moscow 
These concerns translate into a go-slow approach toward nuclear build-ups and to 
a search for confidence building measures and stabilizing arms control accords
7The British and French positions are, for different reasons, also inclined 
more toward arms negotiations with the Soviet Union or to diplomatic maneuver 
over political conflicts than Washington It is no accident that Soviet Premier 
Mikhail S Gorbachev should have made his initial forays in foreign policy, even 
before his predecessor's death, by visiting Britain The Howe speech 
essentially called for a long look at SDI before launching into a program that 
might damage the possibility of reaching some kind of arms stabilization and 
diplomatic accord with the Soviet Union As the Thatcher government moves into 
elections, it will have to strengthen its record in East-West peacemaking, not 
unlike previous English governments dating back to Prime Ministers Harold 
Macmillan and Harold Wilson The cyclical need of European governments to seek 
peaceful settlements and to appease Soviet demands appear to be permanent 
features of the European electoral landscape
French governmental and public opinion has, ironically, been more disposed 
to American firmness than other European allies in the face of Soviet military 
expansion Until Washington's launching of SDI, Paris urged German adoption of 
INF, partly to reinforce Germany's commitment to NATO and partly to ensure 
against a neutralist-leaning West Germany whose moorings to the West might 
progressively weaken and set the center of Europe adrift At a strategic 
nuclear level, Paris prefers deterrence cum detente to Bonn's detente cum 
deterrence
The modernization of French nuclear forces, discussed below, evidences the 
determination of the French, whether on the Right or the Left, to maintain an 
independent nuclear force which can credibly counter the Soviet Union and, as a 
bonus, solidify French military dominance on the western half of the European 
continent This strategic posture reinforces France's privileged status under
8the Four Power accords governing Berlin and Germany Its nuclear forces afford 
Paris, at least in its eyes, the choice of the empty chair in NATO nuclear 
bargaining or of entering East-West arms control talks depending on conjunctural 
need What appears Important to France is bolstering its nuclear position as a 
precondition for encouraging the detente process on its terms Like Washington, 
Paris arms to parley But in contrast to Washington, the Mitterrand government 
is disposed to assure Soviet security concerns in eastern Europe —  and 
certainly those outside Europe —  to a greater degree than U S policy makers 
These differences stem from their dissimilar regional and global Interests and 
roles
All European states also have a major stake in greater East-West trade, 
increasing sales of high technology to eastern Europe, exploitation of 
investment opportunities, and enhanced access to Soviet raw material reserves 
These economic attractions are not only instruments of detente but important in 
their own right The European economies have not enjoyed the same economic 
resurgence as that of the United States They are economically much more 
dependent on eastern Europe than the United States This dependency makes them 
more vulnerable to manipulation by Moscow While they may be counted upon to 
stand with Washington when a critical issue, like INF, is joined, it strains 
credibility, as the fiasco of the pipeline episode evidenced, that they will 
hold ranks when economic advantages are to be had by moderating their diplomatic 
stances and by relaxing economic restrictions on trade with the eastern bloc and
the Soviet Union
9SDI A New Challenge to Atlantic Cohesion
The Strategic Defease Initiative, coming on the heels of the confusion of 
the Carter years, the concern over the nuclear arms race fueled by the Reagan 
administration, and the controversy over INF, threatens to create new, serious 
cleavages between the United States and Europe that will certainly complicate 
and even possibly preclude the achievement of a stable and coherent allied 
response to Soviet nuclear modernization Europeans are more ready than 
Americans to identify a stable nuclear deterrent with low levels of invulnerable 
offensive nuclear systems on both sides and with arms control accords with the 
Soviet Union to confirm a balance based on some notion of essential equivalence 
Over the past decade, the American security community has progressively 
questioned whether the Soviets can be trusted to keep such accords, whether MAD 
makes sense if deterrence breaks down, and whether balanced nuclear 
capabilities, defined by essential equivalence of nuclear weapons (in the 
coinage of throw weight, launchers, and warheads) is sufficient to support 
American diplomacy and bargaining posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or its 
surrogates in the developing world 5 Unlike Europeans, the U S has never been 
comfortable with MAD or with the necessarily simpler civilian targeting plans of 
French and British nuclear forces Even after the McNamara Defense Department's 
acceptance of mutual assured destruction was proclaimed, American nuclear 
planning and targeting remained keyed mor«» to military sites than soft, high 
value economic and population centers In a word, the American posture has 
always been MAD-plus
Evolving nuclear doctrine and the pursuit of arms control accords with the 
Soviet Union during the 1970s have been consistent with MAD-plus —  not simply
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MAD The Schlesinger doctrine and President Carter's PD-59 sought 
simultaneously to provide the American president with a wide menu of nuclear 
options to fight a controlled and even a lengthy limited nuclear war and to 
Include the Soviet leadership into the calculus of deterrence PD-59 
specifically Identified the Soviet power structure as a prime target despite the 
difficulties that would inevitably be encountered in attempting to keep a 
nuclear war limited if the Soviet leadership were annihilated early on in the 
war 5 The American security community has always been more concerned than 
Europeans about maintaining deterrence at all levels of possible hostilities 
It is also preoccupied with the post-attack environment and with bringing a 
nuclear conflict to a swift conclusion on terms favorable to the West
American concern for fighting a nuclear war and for maintaining escalation 
dominance until a nuclear war can be brought to a favorable close has generated 
high offensive military requirements, crystallized in the later Carter years and 
in the first years of the Reagan administration in proposals to modernize U S 
offensive nuclear forces Justification for these requirements was based not 
only on the need to match Soviet capabilities at all nuclear levels, negating 
the advantage perceived to be enjoyed by the Soviet Union in heavy missiles and 
launchers, but also to develop a nuclear posture to underwrite extended 
deterrence in Europe and elsewhere Arms control accords were to serve a 
demanding war-fighting test as well as a perceived American need —  given what 
appeared to be Incessant increases in Soviet European and global nuclear 
capabilities —  to bargain from a position of strength with the Soviet Union 
over arms accords themselves and over conflicts in and outside Europe where 
American and allied interests might be engaged If the Soviet Union could not 
be trusted to keep arms control accords, then trust in the Soviet leadership
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would be rendered irrelevant either by the dominant position that would be 
attained by the West in modernizing American, NATO, and European nuclear forces 
or by imposing stiff arms control and verification requirements on Moscow, tied 
to deep cuts in Soviet strategic forces, especially its ground-based systems
European governmental opinion is at odds with American planners on several 
key points These differences revolve around the desirability of lowered 
nuclear levels, risk-taking with the Soviet Union m  negotiating on lower levels 
rather than in forcing them on an intransigent Moscow by gaining a dominant 
western nuclear posture, and appropriate and verifiable restraints on research 
and development programs -- specifically SDI —  that promise a technological 
breakthrough beyond MAD or MAD-plus It therefore is no accident that Sir 
Geoffrey Howe should have characterized SDI as a fourth option in preserving the 
West's "defence into the next century" in contrast to his third —  and preferred 
option of maintaining "sufficient forces to deter any aggression against us 
and our allies, and to seek at the same time balanced reductions m  these forces 
on both sides
Howe's evaluation of SDI essentially summarizes much of the concerns of 
Europeans with the most ambitious claims made for the Reagan proposal They are 
worth summarizing because they identify most of the major reservations that 
allied governments, with a long record of cooperation and with Washington, have 
m  addressing SDI What was not said by Howe is equally significant —  viz , 
the threat that an American SDI and its Soviet counterpart poses for the 
independence and credibility of French and British nuclear forces This 
consideration adds to the potential for rift in the alliance if SDI goes forward 
m  the absence of allied consultation and cooperation
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Howe's reservations, varymgly echoed in other European capitals despite 
the reported success of the Reagan administration in bringing allies into line, 
signify a yawning gap in European and American thinking about active defense 
systems Discord turns on several key points
1 SDI threatens to narrow political direction of the nuclear 
modernization program since a commitment will be made to an 
expensive technological program before its ramifications for 
strategic stability and mutual confidence-building between 
allies and the Soviet Union have been fully explored 
politics will be put at the mercy of technology
2 Highly computerized, electronically controlled systems 
would reduce human control over reaction time to threats
3 Limited defense of military installations, if effective, 
may have the undesired effect of upgrading more vulnerable, 
civilian targets in Soviet targeting
4 Countermeasures to SDÌ are readily at hand, including 
non-ballistic missile systems such as aircraft, cruise 
missiles and even covert action for which new and potentially 
expensive defenses will have to be built
5 Defensive and offensive forces must be viewed as different 
elements of the East-West strategic balance Neither can be 
considered apart from the other As a result, an expansion of 
defensive systems is likely to provoke not only a similar 
Soviet counter action but an expansion of offensive arms
6 The costs of building a multi-tiered active defense system 
would likely be in the hundreds of billions of dollars
7 The opportunity costs of SDI, in foregoing other nuclear 
and conventional systems needed for stability, would be high 
and potentially destabilizing as NATO would not be able to 
implement a flexible response strategy
8 Arms control would be undermined
—  as suspicions grew in Soviet quarters that the U S and 
the West sought nuclear superiority,
—  as the ABM treaty was eroded,
—  as hedges were taken by both sides to increase their 
offensive nuclear weapons and to accelerate active and
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passive defense programs, and
—  as opportunities to make real arms control gains, such 
as limits on ASAT systems, were ignored in the controversy 
Inevitably raised by new defense programs
9 Allied mutual confidence would be damaged in the long 
transition process toward implementation of SDI
—  Uncertainties about the stability of the nuclear 
balance would arise,
—  Doubts would grow in western capitals that the same 
sense of the individisibility of NATO territory was not 
shared by all allies As the U S was able to reduce 
damage to its territory and sanctuarize its homeland, it 
might be prepared (as French critics alleged) to pursue its 
own notion of detente with the Soviet Union at the expense 
of its west European allies 8
The latter point is of special importance from the perspective of western 
and, specifically, U S -French-British cohesion An enlarged active defense 
system might well be ineffective vis-à-vis the superpower, but it promises to 
have attractions for the Soviet Union against British and French and third state 
nuclear forces For differing reasons the superpowers may have an interest in 
pursuing and deploying a limited active defense system Such a course —  
whether consciously undertaken or the unwitting result of an offsetting 
superpower arms race —  would potentially have its most damaging impact on 
British and French nuclear forces What may well be intended by Washington as 
an escape from MAD-plus promises to end by pitting the United States in an arms 
race with its own allies, with the Soviet Union as the only net gainer it is 
in this context that British insistence on holding the Reagan administration to 
its pledge to negotiate any deployment of SDI with the Soviet Union can be 
understood as a claim by London to have a veto or lien on U S security policy 
in this area 9
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The Threat Posed to Allied Cohesion by 
British and French Nuclear Forces of the 1990s
The French and British nuclear systems, already impressive, will be 
formidable by the mid-1990s if current modernization plans are executed France 
is scheduled to have seven nuclear submarines available, six of which will be 
armed with M-4 SLBMs, each armed with 6 150 kt MIRVed warheads A seventh 
submarine will carry 16 M-20 1 mg warheads, making a total of 592 strategic 
warheads To these forces will very likely be added up to 100 to be developed 
mobile IRBMs to replace the 18 vulnerable IRBMs on the Albion Plateau Eighteen 
Mirage IVs and approximately 140 Mirage 2000s and Super-Etendards will be 
equipped with a medium-range air-to-surface missile (ASMP) armed with a 100-300 
kt warhead 10
The British fleet of 4 Trident Submarines, each carrying 16 Trident II 
launchers and armed with from 8 to 17 warheads, will match French striking 
power If one assumes 14 warheads per missile with MV warheads of 150 kt , the 
British will dispose almost 900 warheads, over four times what the present 
Polaris fleet is estimated to carry The Tornado, which will come into full 
service by the end of the decade, will also very likely be assigned nuclear 
missions I*
Combined, the British and French nuclear strategic missile forces may well 
dispose almost 1500 warheads by the mid-1990s, not counting aircraft launched 
missiles and warheads These forces can no longer be viewed with indifference 
by either superpower —  or by Britain or France of each other From the Soviet 
perspective, planners will have to take these European systems into account in 
deciding their offensive and defensive requirements and in targeting increasing
fr
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absolute portions of the Soviet strike force against these systems What may 
have begun as a bargaining ploy In START —  to count European nuclear systems 
against American and NATO totals —  Is likely to be a permanent factor In Soviet 
calculations Arms control agreements, already difficult, will prove that much 
harder to achieve since four, not two, autonomous systems will be factored 
together
The British and French systems, officially viewed since the Ottowa 
declaration as a net addition to the western deterrent, must themselves be 
re-examined to determine whether they add or subtract from a stable East-West 
and West-West nuclear balance From an American viewpoint, British and French 
forces pose several acute problems First, they are autonomous While 
decentralization may complicate Soviet planning, It should also Increase 
American anxiety about when, where, and under what circumstances nuclear weapons 
will be threatened or used
Second, European systems, while powerful, are still smaller, and potentially 
more vulnerable than the American system They may be more easily blinded by a 
Soviet first strike than their American counterparts Improvements ln ASW or 
bombardment techniques to create giant waves may render then Increasingly 
susceptible to Soviet suppression Under crisis conditions, Incentives to 
pre-empt these forces may be overwhelming
Third, European systems may trigger American nuclear forces —  wittingly or 
not —  in their attempting to stop Soviet aggression French and British 
nuclear forces have less time and space within which to maneuver than those of 
the United States Fourth, once begun, controlling a nuclear conflict will be 
increasingly difficult Both France and Britain essentially follow proportional 
deterrence strategies in which each threaten the Soviet Union with damage in
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excess of any possible gain that might arise from an aggressor's attack on their 
vital interests Given their smaller systems, prime targets are presumably 
economic and population centers The kind of escalation control or calibrated 
nuclear exchanges, envisioned by American planners, promise to be nullified as 
French or British strategies are potentially forced on the superpowers
Several contrasting sets of incentives arise from these strategic choices 
facing the western nuclear states First, American efforts to gain greater 
control over the British or French systems is likely to meet with opposition, 
increasing conflict and tensions between the western allies Here the past is 
prologue The French succeeded in developing their systems independently of the 
Ü S over American objections Washington sold the Trident system to Britain, 
fearing that London would penalize conventional readiness and reduce its NATO 
commitments in order to save its nuclear autonomy U S collusion with the 
Soviet Union against its alliance partners is possible, but not very probable —  
much less desirable The current deep suspicions surrounding U S -Soviet 
relations preclude fruitful cooperation along these lines Washington would 
also have to reverse itself in considering some proliferation as a bolstering of 
western deterrence It might also begin hedging on its commitments to its 
allies, although much of the justification of increased American nuclear power 
and the two-track decision for INF deployment was presumably aimed at 
reinforcing extended deterrence
Encouraging Western Cooperation and East-West Stability
The increasing multllaterizatlon of nuclear deterrence must now be accepted 
as a fact of strategic life The modernization and expansion of nuclear forces 
has created a complex set or deterrence relations between adversaries and,
*17
implicitly, between allies who have an interest in knowing and in controlling 
each other'8 nuclear behavior —  announced and operational Several 
simultaneous mutually dependent bilateral relations can be identified between 
the superpowers, between each of them and the French and British systems, and 
between the British and French nuclear deterrents These four interdependent 
deterrent systems also have an Impact on the capacity of other European states, 
in and out of NATO, in realizing their security Interests Most critically, the 
problem of German perceptions and anxieties over security again arise and, with 
them, the adequacy of western policies in reassuring not only each other but 
also their key allies
Untangling, analytically, these interdependencies and Identifying those 
elements that might be influenced to preserve or enhance a stable nuclear 
balance are not easy tasks As noted earlier, a western nuclear deterrent must 
meet two tests sufficiency in deterring Soviet aggression through alliance 
cohesion and domestic support The SDI proposal, however much it may address 
Soviet capabilities, clearly complicates llliance cohesion, so also does the 
uninhibited modernization of independent nuclear systems within the western bloc 
threaten alliance cohesion, coherence and mutual confidence, and, by these 
tokens, the stability of the East-West nuclear balance
The western nuclear allies have several options First, they can ignore 
the problem —  but only at their peril Second, they can attempt to bring 
pressure on each other to conform to their preferred strategies, force postures, 
and arms control stances The record of achievement by going this route is not 
encouraging Third, they can begin recognizing their shared, if differential, 
problems in dealing with the Soviet Union and themselves and begin to develop a 
systematic consultative and negotiating framework between and among themselves
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to relax, if not resolve, their differences It is not sufficient for the 
requirements of strategic stability that only the superpowers meet at Geneva 
The growth of independent nuclear systems and, now, the possibility of an SDI 
points to the need for sustained bilateral talks between the western nuclear 
allies to arrest the erosion of western confidence and cooperation
Because of the constraints of national autonomy and the myths of 
independence entertained by the western nuclear powers, as well as the record of 
failure in creating multilateral nuclear decision-making bodies for the 
alliance, like the proposal of President Charles de Gaulle for a NATO nuclear 
directorate, it would seem best that a strategy of complex bilateralism be 
adopted as a useful way to proceed Each western state would approach its 
nuclear ally as an political equal aware that its differential strategic needs 
will have to be bargained about The special British-American relationship 
should be deepened between London and Washington and extended by London and 
Washington —  each, however, acting independently —  to Paris The aim of these 
talks would be to achieve some shared notion of western nuclear stability, 
including accepted rules and guidelines on modernization and negotiating 
postures vis-a-vis the Soviet Union No one set of bilateral accords can ensure 
stability, but it should be the goal of these institutionalized discussions as 
well as associated intergovernmental nuclear and conventional planning sessions 
that over-all deterrence be enhanced and that the East-West balance be preserved 
at tolerable levels of shared risk and cost, acceptable to the home populations 
of the western states
The agenda is rich for these bilateral talks The list itself identifies 
many of the powerful incentives —  positive and negative —  that prompt serious 
consideration of new bargaining and negotiating frameworks within the West
19
First, the western nuclear states have a keen interest in each others targeting 
priorities, strategies of implementation, nuclear capabilities, and C3l systems 
All have some need to avoid catalytic war, prompted by an ally, redundancy of 
targeting, uncontrollable nuclear exchanges, and common efforts to bring a 
nuclear war to a swift conclusion
Except for some joint planning discussions within NATO, primarily focused 
on the European theatre, and bilateral British-American talks, France, Britain, 
and the United States have developed their own targeting systems quite 
independently of each other It has served their interests to retain maximum 
autonomy over their targeting plans and to keep them secret from each other 
While overcoming these barriers is not likely to be possible in the near future, 
any hope of developing mutual allied confidence in each other hinges on working 
toward some broad accord in this area
The implications of offensive nuclear systems and active defensive forces 
for raising the costs and risks of preparing or fighting nuclear war need also 
to be jointly explored to the degree that the negotiating parties are prepared 
to address these issues All of the western nuclear states have an Interest in 
avoiding accidental, unauthorized, unintended nuclear war as well as slowing or 
dampening the rate of the current arms race and its mounting costs
These agenda items are linked to the perennial of conventional deterrence 
Mounting credible conventional warfare strategies implies some control over 
nuclear expenditures and allied cooperation in the first stages of battle The 
French have been the most reluctant to join in such discussions and planning 
and, for well-known reasons, will almost certainly continue to resist allied 
pressures to agree on joint military plans and to accept a designated alliance 
role for their conventional forces As in the past it will most likely insist
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on autonomy of decision, most especially in utilizing its conventional forces as 
an instrument of its deterrence manuevering 12 While there is some evidence 
that the incentives for splendid isolation have slackened in French strategic 
circles,13 they cannot be counted upon in the near term to overcome French 
reservations about any hint of automatic participation in the forward defense of 
Europe
The incentives to encourage more bilateral discuasions with the French and 
with the British are logically related to their common Interest in American 
strategic moves, the Implementation of U S first use doctrine, and in keeping 
American forces in Europe as a visible and credible pledge of the American 
security guarantee, coupled to access to the American nuclear arsenal U S 
assistance in decreasing vulnerable French c3l systems promises to be an 
incentive worth manipulating to bring France to a bilateral French-American 
bargaining table that might well include cooperation in conventional areas on 
use-strategies, in dividing responsibilities (tacitly or explicitly) in Europe, 
and even on joint development and purchase of conventional arms
SDI is an especially significant area for inner-allied discussions The 
concerns voiced by Sir Geoffrey Howe and the obvious threat posed by active 
defense systems to British and French nuclear forces generate incentives for 
mutual discussions and bargaining over the material terms of allied deterrence 
The U S has taken a correct step in suggesting joint US-European cooperation on 
technological development of such defense systems This step re-affirms the 
principle of allied cooperation in nuclear affairs pursued throughout the INF 
episode What is not clear is whether the application of this principle will be 
to soften allied anxieties over SDI by dangling the possibility of sharing in 
technological advances, not to mention lush defense contracts, or to divide them
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by placing them in competición with themselves in bidding for Washington's 
favor The first reaction of the French was to organize a European bloc 
apparently to bargain with Washington from a position of strength or, falling in 
that scheme, to go it alone in building a European active defense program —  or 
at least the technologies closely associated with this initiative ( e g ,  optical 
electronics, high powered lasers, and artificial intelligence) What is 
important to recognize is that there are incentives at play that are attractive 
to the Europeans to be on the ground floor of any major technological push in 
this area
Those more concerned about the arms control rather than the technological 
implications of SOI, like the British, also have an incentive to open bilateral 
talks with Washington, although it is far from clear whether American security 
policy-makers are prepared to accept a potentially constraining dialogue with 
their allies over SOI in order to gain more leverage over the latters' nuclear 
policies and their commitments to alliance conventional deterrence and defense 
For the U S , SOI may be seen as a bargaining chip to bring about greater 
alliance cohesion For the Europeans, participation in SDI may yield 
technological gains —  civilian and military —  and (as Sir Geoffrey Howe's 
March address suggests) leverage over the evolution of American arms control
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policy
Bilateral American-British, American-French consultations do not preclude 
French-Brltlsh talks along the same lines Nor, as French initiatives 
illustrate, do joint European efforts to progressively Europeanize European 
security imply moves adverse to American Interests Within an evolving European 
framework motored by Intense bilateral negotiations, West Germany may well be 
able to pursue its security Interests on terms that re-afflrm its renunciation
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of nuclear weapons under the West European Union treaty Any effort to 
encourage the Europeans to assume increased responsibility for their own defense 
within the Atlantic Alliance framework promises more long term stability than
the current disarray that ignores or attempts to paper over the deep fissures 
within the alliance
Finally, there is the Soviet Union France and Britain maintain that they 
will not reduce their systems until the superpowers decrease theirs The 
nuclear capacity of the European states and the Interest they have in 
restraining the superpowers, whether admitted by them or not, raises their brave 
front into question Allied anxieties about bilateral allied talks with the 
Soviet Union are likely to be quieted if more confident and confidential talks 
are held between the western nuclear powers first At a minimum all parties 
have an interest in avoiding accidental warfare and in lowering (though at 
different rates and levels) the costs and risks of nuclear war All have an 
interest, too, in slowing the rate of vertical proliferation of their arms races 
and in regulating the negative impact of vertical proliferation on horizontal 
proliferation None of these problems can be addressed in the absence of 
coordinated western nuclear policies and the cooperación of the Soviet Union
Conclusions
The growing interdependence and multilateralization of nuclear deterrence 
are permanent parts of the strategic landscape surrounding the decision-making 
of the western nuclear powers and the Soviet Union To meet the Soviet threat 
and to ensure a stable nuclear balance between East and West, the western 
nuclear powers have strong incentives to abandon their essentially unilateralist 
approach to nuclear strategic policy in order to develop the coherence,
I t
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cohesion, and mutual confidence required to meet the test of stable deterrence 
This need offsets the dubious value of uncertainty created in the minds of 
Soviet planners by the decentralization of the western nuclear systems The 
uncertainty generated within the alliance by the growth of offensive nuclear 
systems and doubts about the reliability of allies when they are most needed do 
not compensate for the attributed benefits of keeping Soviet planners guessing 
The SDI proposal, unless carefully managed and orchestrated in the West, 
risks straining to a breaking point the structural problems that already 
characterize allied strategic relations The Geneva talks do not appear wide 
and deep enough to contain the powerful forces and Interests at play within the 
Atlantic Alliance The western states must address their problems on a scale 
commensurate with their dimensions A process of complex bilateralism offers 
some promise of reconciling continuing assertions of national autonomy with the 
imperatives of multilateral deterrence and the imperatives of interdependence 
and cooperation generated by the overlapping strategic dilemmas confronting the 
western nuclear states and the Soviet Union
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